North Korea and Iran: Compare & Contrast

It’s suspected that North Korea may attempt a third nuclear weapon test in the near future. One may remember that the previous two tests were fizzles. That is, there was evidence that a chain reaction was achieved, but the yields were extremely low. Because of this, some consider North Korea a defacto nuclear weapons state, and others do not. 

While “North Korea” and “Iran” are often uttered in the same breath, they are different in a number of ways. This is exemplified in a BBC story  today that reports that the Israeli military Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz,  does not believe Iran will build a nuclear weapon. 

So what are the differences between North Korea and Iran? North Korea is unambiguously and unabashedly pursuing nuclear weapons. The aforementioned tests are the ultimate proof. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) by invoking the withdrawal clause (Art. 10). Iran, on the other hand, claims that it doesn’t intend to build nuclear weapons. Presently, Iran remains a member of the NPT and its nuclear facilities are under safeguards by the IAEA to prevent the creation and diversion of undeclared fissile materials.

What are the similarities? Both countries have a history of being less than forthcoming about their nuclear facilities. North Korea’s waffling about whether it had uranium enrichment facilities is well-documented, as is its reneging on deals involving its nuclear program. Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities (both at Natanz and Qom) were not discovered by voluntary disclosure. (FYI – Iran claims that in accordance with the technicalities of their Safeguards Agreement, these facilities weren’t yet in a state in which they were obligated to be reported.) 

While Iran, unlike the DPRK, has done no nuclear testing, intelligence reports have suggested that they have conducted research on the non-dual use elements of nuclear bomb production. The November IAEA Board Report details intelligence on these activities. (The more recent February Board Report adds nothing new on this subject.)

There is a feeling by some, particularly of the Neocon persuasion, that everybody would be better off if Iran were outside the NPT. Their argument goes like this. It would be better to have a system in which cheaters were outside the regime and those in compliance were exclusively inside. I’m not sure I buy this argument. It seems to me that having Iran under safeguards slows their progress toward a bomb (if that is their intent) and may help to check their ambitions.

It may seem that the case that Iran wants a nuclear weapon is clear-cut. First, there appears to be reliable intelligence that Iran has developed non-dual use technologies.  Second, their fissile material production capability makes no economic sense (unless they believe: a.) there will certainly be a vast expansion of nuclear energy globally; b.) they will be capable of breaking into the market as a supplier at competitive prices; c.) they will be able to achieve “b” despite the fact that the facilities set to come online among the current fuel suppliers [e.g. the American Centrifuge Facility] are optimized to fuel production and are thus much more efficient at it than the centrifuges that were optimized dual, civilian and military, roles [e.g. purely peaceful-use centrifuges can be much larger and / or closely spaced with out risk of achieving a critical mass (i.e. potentially blowing your facility to kingdom come).] However, while it may be true that Iran wants to have the capability to rapidly assemble a nuclear arsenal, i.e. a latent nuclear weapons capability, it does not follow that they want to have nuclear weapons. So Lt. Gen. Gantz may well be correct, and still not radically out of line with the Israeli political position.

To sum up, North Korea clearly wants to be a nuclear weapons state. Iran, on the other hand, may only want to have a latent nuclear weapons capability. Treating these identically may not be ideal.